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Abstract Using a legal framework, doctrinal analysis, critical legal analysis, and fun-
damental legal research and drawing upon legislation, case law, judicial, and schol-
arly commentary, this article defines the fiduciary duties of Canadian university
governing boards given the unique features of the university as a legal entity. The
legal analysis considers the Canadian university as a corporation, distinguishing it
from other types of corporations, identifying the charitable, not-for-profit, public/pri-
vate dimensions of universities in Canada, and significantly, considering the judicially
recognized “community of scholars” and collegial features of universities. The article
argues that all of these features shape the fiduciary duties of governing boards and
have implications for shared collegial governance in Canadian universities.
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Introduction
The Canadian university is a complicated legal entity that is fashioned by old and
new statutes, case law, history, custom, and usage. Yet there is very little research
documenting its unique legal nature and analyzing the resulting fiduciary responsi-
bilities of the board of governors that flow from this status within a shared gover-
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nance context. Recent events in several universities across Canada provide evidence
of confusion and misunderstandings about the fiduciary duties of the board of gov-
ernors. In the absence of a full understanding of the university as a socio-legal-his-
torical entity, with medieval roots and a unique role in society (Fallis 2007; Harris,
1976; Kerr, 2001), university leadership have mistakenly reached for legal principles
governing modern, private business corporations to understand the scope and nature
of their obligations. This approach fails to account for the institutional context of
the university, and the legally recognized collegial, charitable, and not-for-profit di-
mensions of the university, which complicate our understanding of governing board
fiduciary duties. Consequently, in a number of instances, Canadian university boards
have imperilled the fiduciary duties they owe to the university and to the public,
triggering non-confidence motions from within universities and external governance
reviews from outside the university (see Canadian Association of University Teachers,
2015; CBC News, 2015; Curran, 2011; Goudge, 2015; Johnson, 2016; Murray,
2016; University of Concordia News, 2011; Winders, 2015).
This article presents data from a research project that examines governance issues
in Canadian universities. It focuses on the fiduciary duties owed by Canadian (pub-
licly funded) university governing boards. Publicly funded, secular universities dom-
inate the university sector in Canadian higher education in terms of numbers of
institutions, enrollment, funding, regulation, and policymaking. Unlike other juris-
dictions, only a small number of private, mostly faith-based, universities exist in
Canada. For this reason, this article’s analysis will focus on publicly funded Canadian
universities. Using a legal framework this article identifies distinguishing legal fea-
tures of the Canadian publicly funded university and establishes the university as a
unique legal entity. A central objective of this research is to identify the fiduciary du-
ties of governing boards within this unique legal context, employing doctrinal and
critical legal analysis and drawing upon relevant statutes, case law, judicial, and schol-
arly commentary. The article defines the legal concept of fiduciary duty in a univer-
sity context and examines who boards of governors owe fiduciary duties to, what
they owe fiduciary duties for, and in what form and to what standard of conduct.
Finally, this article offers an analysis of some implications for shared collegial gover-
nance in Canadian universities.
Methods
This article employs doctrinal research, fundamental legal research, and critical legal
analysis. Doctrinal methodology focuses on case law, statutes, and other legal sources
of law in order to identify and explicate what the law is on a particular issue and to es-
tablish the legal principles that can be discerned from the legal sources. It has been
described as lying “at the basis of the common law and is the core legal research
method” (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012, p. 85). The doctrinal method traces legal
precedent and legislative interpretation through case law offering “a critical conceptual
analysis of all relevant legislation and case law to reveal a statement of the law relevant
to the matter under investigation” (Hutchinson, 2014, p. 584). It necessarily involves:
an understanding of the rules of precedent between the court juris-








knowledge such as the difference between civil and criminal juris-
dictions, and various tests of liability, along with the acknowledged
reasoning methods borrowed from philosophy and logic , such as
induction and deduction. (Hutchinson, 2015, p. 131)
When purely applied, the doctrinal approach can be insular, in that it looks at
the law within itself, and not within a broader context. It identifies what the law is
at a given time. It does not consider what the law could or should be, nor does it cri-
tique the law. However, doctrinal research is a necessary starting point for any legal
analysis, especially when the law in a particular area is uncertain, evolving, or com-
plicated, as is the case with the fiduciary duties of university governing boards.
To counter the limitations of doctrinal research, this article moves beyond doc-
trinal analysis and includes critical legal analysis (Minow, 2013) to determine the
implications of the body of legal principles on governance within the university, and
where and how the legal principles apply in a university setting. This involves ex-
posing “unstated assumptions, patterns or results, internally inconsistent structures
or other tensions within a body of law or legal practices or institutions” and high-
lighting “the tensions, contradictions or paradoxes behind the surface of law or legal
practices” (Minow, 2013, p. 68). This approach combines the scholarship from
higher education on the university with legal doctrine to deepen the understanding
of the complexity of university governance. In this respect, this approach includes
non-doctrinal dimensions and is cross-disciplinary. This methodological approach,
therefore, includes “fundamental research” (Arthurs, 1983, p. 68), understanding
the law as a social, historical, philosophical, and political phenomenon.
In this project, establishing the doctrinal law involved researching and analyzing
the constituting statutes of public universities across Canada and the provincial leg-
islation governing the higher education systems. Relevant non-education, provincial,
and federal statutes were also considered, such as the Canadian Constitution Act,
(1982) and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, (Part I, Constitution Act,
1982), as well as relevant corporate and not-for-profit legislation. To this was added
case law (that is, judge-made law) on university governance, corporate governance,
charity governance, university autonomy, and the fiduciary duties of university/cor-
porate/charity governing boards. To round out the data sources and analysis, various
reviews of governance at universities across Canada were considered. Major com-
missions, reports, and task forces on university governance by government, non-
governmental organizations, and constituents within the higher education sector
were also analyzed where they addressed or established legal interpretations or prece-
dents in law on university governance.
The legal status of Canadian universities
Canadian publicly funded universities are constituted as independent, autonomous,
not-for-profit corporate entities by either a primary piece of provincial or federal leg-
islation, royal charter, or royal proclamation. In this respect universities are unlike
private business corporations, which are typically created in Canada through the fil-
ing of articles of incorporation by an individual or an organization where there is








are met.1 By stark contrast, Canadian provincial governments control and regulate
the establishment of publicly funded universities fairly closely through parliamentary
legislatures. This means that in order to establish a university that will receive public
funding, a parliamentary bill has to be prepared, debated, and passed in the legisla-
ture, with all its checks and balances. Public funds are set aside in a provincial gov-
ernments’ budget to support the operating costs of the university. In this regard,
universities are treated, in their creation, regulation, and at law, as special purpose
corporations with explicit public, teaching, research, and service missions.
Unlike private business corporations, public universities have no shareholders,
no owners, and no share capital. They are, instead, constituency-based. Akin to not-
for-profit corporate organizations, they have a board of governors (instead of a board
of directors), and are made up of a membership base who elect/appoint its board.
This arrangement offers representation on the board for the internal membership,
and it offers oversight with external members. It also signifies that the board is ac-
countable to and owes duties to the membership/constituent base. In a not-for-profit
organization these arrangements are usually spelled out in the constituting statute
of the organization (Bourgeois, 2002a, 2002b; Carter & Prendergast, 2011).
Notwithstanding these legal features, it is important to note that Canadian uni-
versities have a dual governance structure and multiple governing boards (both an
academic senate and a financial board). Governance arrangements within universities
vary by province and by institution—typically one must look at the constituting leg-
islation of the specific university, and the provincial legislation governing the higher
education system in which the university is located, to determine the exact gover-
nance structures, the constituents of the university, and the governing boards and
their roles, responsibilities, and the scope of their respective authority. However, the
dominant model of university governance across Canada is bicameralism, where ac-
ademic policy and educational matters are the authority of a senior decision-making,
senate-type body (made up of a majority of internal members and faculty) that runs
parallel to a board of governors (made up of a majority of members external to the
university) responsible for the management of finances and administrative functions
(Jones, Shanahan, & Goyan, 2004).2 Both of these governing boards in the university
include elected representatives from the collegium, internal to the constituents of
the university (i.e., faculty, staff, and students).
Once established by government, however, Canadian universities enjoy high in-
stitutional autonomy, and university senates and governing boards have considerable
independence from government in their management of day-to-day internal and ac-
ademic affairs. Government and the courts are loath to intervene in internal matters
and disputes within the university (Davis, 2015a; Shanahan, 2015a). This principle
of autonomy and non-intervention, while not enshrined in statute, is widely recog-
nized in case law by the highest courts in Canada (Harelkin v. University of Regina,
1979; Harrison v. University of British Columbia, 1991; Kulchyski v. Trent University,
2001; McKinney v. University of Guelph et al., 1990). Yet there is a tension between
the university’s independence and the quasi-judicial nature of its boards (senate and
governing board) on the one hand, and its concomitant responsibilities to its imme-








other hand. The Supreme Court of Canada has captured the complicated au-
tonomous, yet public service and trust-like nature of the university thusly:
While a university, incorporated by a statute and subsidized by public
funds, may in sense be regarded as a public service entrusted with
the responsibility of ensuring the higher education of a large number
of citizens, as was held in “Polten”, its immediate and direct respon-
sibility extends primarily to its present members and, in practice, its
governing bodies function as domestic tribunals when they act in a
quasi-judicial capacity. The Act countenances the domestic autonomy
of the university by making provision for the solution of conflicts
within the university. (Harelkin v. University of Regina, 1979, p. 594)
The legal autonomy of universities is a double-edge sword. It shrouds (but does
not completely protect) university board and senate internal decision-making from
external review, making internal and external accountability processes even more
critical. University boards have the power to make policies and codes that govern
their own conduct and decision-making. They also have the power to act as quasi-
judicial tribunals reviewing their own decisions on university academic and non-
academic matters. But with this public grant of autonomy and self-governance, come
enormous responsibility and a profusion of duties. In all of their decision-making
and conduct, university boards are held to the highest legal standards. They cannot
act with impunity. Their decisions and conduct can be ultimately reviewed by courts
and government by way of: judicial reviews of board/senate decisions; government
reviews; law suits for negligence or mismanagement; malfeasance in a public office;
or breach of contract among other legal avenues (Freeman-Maloy v. Marsden, 2006;
Fridman, 1973).
At the same time, over the years Canadian universities have become captured
by developing case law and statutory frameworks, beyond their own constituting
legal documents, which they are compelled to follow and which impact the duties
and obligations of governing boards. Legally, Canadian publicly funded universities
are considered at common law to be charities, and they are typically registered as
charities with the federal government. Beyond favourable income tax implications,
the charitable status of the publicly funded university in Canada heightens and ex-
tends the duties of governing board members, especially around dealings with the
charitable property of the university (Davis, 2015a).
With the passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, case
law has evolved in Canada around the public-private nature of the university in the
context of the applicability of the Charter to universities. In the United Kingdom
and the United States, publicly funded universities have long been considered as
quasi-public institutions (Farrington & Palfreyman, 2006). Since the Supreme Court
of Canada found the Charter of Rights and Freedoms only applies to government
action or the action of government agents (RWSDU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 1986),
many assumed it did not apply to the Canadian university with its legally au-
tonomous status. However, Canadian case law over the last three decades has altered
this understanding, and has established that, in certain instances when carrying out








courts as agents of the government, and in these instances, the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms will apply to their actions (Eldridge v. British Columbia [Attorney General],
1997; Pridgen v. University of Calgary, 2012; Shanahan, 2015a). This public-private
legal status of the university impacts on the nature and extent of the duties university
governing boards owe to the university’s constituents (i.e., students, staff, and faculty)
in any given situation.
If the university governing board is found at law to be acting in a governmental
capacity in a particular instance, its actions may attract Charter scrutiny, and the gov-
erning board must uphold the rights and freedoms afforded to individuals under
the Charter in its conduct and decision-making. In other circumstances, the actions
and relationships of Canadian universities are considered at law as private in nature
and governed by contract or tort law. For instance, Eldridge v. British Columbia
[Attorney General], 1997, sets out the test for whether the Charter should apply to a
private entity. In this case, the Supreme Court confirmed that if a private entity is
acting under a statutorily granted authority, its actions will be subject to Charter
scrutiny, and it will be deemed to be included in the definition of “government.” An
autonomous entity will attract Charter scrutiny in the “implementation of a statutory
scheme or government program” (para 44). Since provincial governments have ex-
clusive authority over public education under the Constitution, which they delegate
to universities through provincial legislation, the argument can be made that the
Charter captures universities in their delivery of public education. Hence, the Charter
has been found to apply to university student disciplinary proceedings (Pridgen v.
University of Calgary, 2012). However, by contrast, the Supreme Court has found
that human resources policymaking is an internal management activity and a private
matter between the university and the employee. Therefore, mandatory retirement
policies within collective agreements of universities did not infringe on the Charter
rights of universities employees (McKinney v. University of Guelph et al., 1990).3
Nevertheless, there is considerable uncertainty as the multifaceted relationship be-
tween the university and its constituents is determined on a case-by-case basis and
governed by multiple areas of law. This creates confusion for university boards. Davis
observes, Canadian universities “exist uncertainly on the line between a public and
private institution” (2015a, p. 61).
In addition to being considered special purpose, not-for-profit, quasi-public,
charity, and a corporation, the Canadian university is also recognized by the Supreme
Court of Canada as a collegium or “community of scholars.” The Supreme Court of
Canada has stated, “The Act incorporates a university and does not alter the tradi-
tional nature of such an institution as a community of scholars and students enjoying
substantial internal autonomy…” (Harelkin v. University of Regina, 1979, p. 594).
This is judicial recognition, at the highest level, of the university collegium in Canada
and its import cannot be understated. Significantly the Supreme Court clearly notes
that the university’s legal status as a corporation does not supplant its collegial nature.
Its corporate structure does not have paramountcy over its collegial structure. Its
corporate structure exists alongside its collegial structure and processes. In fact, his-
torically in Canada and the United States, the university’s collegial structure predates








making in the university distinguishes its governance arrangements from the boards
of directors of modern, private business corporations in Canada (see University of
Western Ontario, 1996).
As collegiums, university-constituting statutes in Canada create university gov-
erning bodies (boards and senates) designed for democratic constituency represen-
tation rather than corporate strategic management. Historically, the trend in Canada
has been toward increasing the democratization of university boards. This is evi-
denced in the Duff–Berdahl Report (1966) recommendations, which have led to
changes over the last few decades in Canadian universities and their governing
statutes around the composition of governing boards and senates to include elected
representatives from various constituents within the university. This particular feature
of Canadian universities can be problematic, as government higher education policy
in Canada has increasingly required universities to strategically manage resources
and to strategically plan for the future.4
Each of these features of the Canadian publicly funded university (i.e., special
purpose, not-for-profit, quasi-public, charitable, corporation, and constituency-based
collegium), which are recognized at common law and/or in statutory law, influences
the shape and machinations of the university as an institution. Universities are sub-
ject to federal and provincial statutory and case law, corporate law, not-for-profit law,
the law of charities and trusts, contract law, tort law, as well as being subject to the
equitable prerogative jurisdiction of the courts as a charity or trust. All of this is
grafted onto the traditional “community of scholars,” with its historical customs, tra-
ditions, core principles, and practices recognized by case law (Harelkin v. University
of Regina, 1979, p. 594). These features shape the nature and scope of the fiduciary
duties of university governing boards. Where and how fiduciary duties apply, to
whom they are owed, for what, and to what standard of care—and what all of this
looks like in a university setting is unique and legally complicated, crossing multiple
areas of law. The second half of this article will untangle some of these considerations
in applying the law of fiduciary duty to university governing boards in Canada.
Fiduciary duty defined
Fiduciary duty is a doctrine originating in trust. It requires that one
party, the fiduciary, act with absolute loyalty toward another party,
the beneficiary or cestui que trust, in managing the latter’s affairs.
(Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24. P.274,
para 22)
A fiduciary relationship is a legal relationship of trust between two people (or
between a person and a group/class of people) called the fiduciary and the
principal/beneficiary. The fiduciary is a type of trustee and acts for the benefit of an-
other who is the principal/beneficiary (Shanahan, 2017). It is one of the highest du-
ties created in law. For the purposes of this analysis it is worth emphasizing that the
fiduciary duties emerge from a relationship between two people (Alberta v. Elder
Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011). In Canada it has been long established by the
Supreme Court that in a corporate setting the board of directors owes a fiduciary








the board of governors of a university, as fiduciaries, owes a fiduciary duty to the
university as a corporation and owes a fiduciary duty as trustees to the university as
a charitable organization.
General fiduciary duty 
Fiduciary responsibilities can be set out in the constituting statute of a university or
other legislation governing the sector, and it can also be imposed by the common
law. At common law the general requirements for the imposition of a fiduciary duty
on a relationship is set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Alberta v. Elder
Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011. The hallmark principles include an express or im-
plied undertaking of loyalty by the fiduciary to act in the beneficiary’s best interests.
The relationship involves the unilateral exercise of power or discretion by the fidu-
ciary that affects the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests where the beneficiary
may be vulnerable to the person holding the discretion or power. The law of fiduciary
duties protects against the abuse of power in certain types of relationships or cir-
cumstances (Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011).
There are two aspects to the fiduciary duty: a duty of loyalty and a duty of care.
Some legal commentaries on fiduciary duties add on the duty of obedience that flows
from these two duties of loyalty and care. In the university setting the statutory and
common law duty of care owed by governors and officers of the university has been
summed up by the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges
(2014) in the following way:
The duty of care generally requires officers and governing board
members to carry out their responsibilities in good-faith and using
that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent per-
son would reasonably exercise under similar circumstances in like
positions. Accordingly, a board member must act in a manner that he
or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the institution.
The duty of loyalty means that the board member must not act in
their own individual interests, or the interests of another person or
organization, but rather must act in the interests of the university and
its’ not-for-profit or charitable purposes. They must act reasonably
and in good faith and not out of expedience, avarice or self-interest. 
A third fiduciary duty, which is arguably an element of the duties
of care and loyalty, is the duty of obedience. This is the duty of
board members to ensure that the college or university is operating
in furtherance of its stated purposes (as set forth in its governing
documents) and is operating in compliance with the law. (pp. 2)5
Board members have a duty to act in good faith toward members of the univer-
sity and a duty to consult member constituents of the university and they also have
a duty of disclosure (although it is less clear to whom and for what).6 The duty of
care involves being informed, showing up for meetings, voting, and apprising oneself
of the policies and operation of the organization. If one draws on the scholarship of








contends that at minimum, “This incorporates the expectation that a director will
maintain an awareness of the company’s activities and financial position, monitor its
policies and actions, and investigate developments where appropriate. Ignorance of
corporate affairs or failing to act in adverse circumstances is not acceptable” (p. 253).
Barker’s comments suggest that external board members sitting on university gov-
erning boards must learn about the university as a unique institution, its history, cus-
toms, and practices. Therefore, importing erroneous principles from the private
corporate business world or elsewhere would be unacceptable.
The English courts have always considered loyalty to the company as a fundamen-
tal duty of corporate directors, and this has been understood in terms of directors not
acting “for any collateral purpose” (Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd, [1942, p. 306] as cited
in Barker, p. 252). The duty of loyalty of board members in a university setting includes
avoiding or declaring personal conflicts of interests with the university’s interests, rep-
resenting the organization in a positive manner, and observing confidentiality. The
duty of confidentiality is not a gag order on board members on all board discussions
and deliberations. Meetings of Canadian university boards are generally open, and no-
tice of meetings is supposed to be given to the constituent members of the organization
and the public. In camera meetings are held only if the matter at hand involves personal
confidential information or sensitive material relating to the university.7
The duty of obedience flows from the duty of care and loyalty and involves mak-
ing sure the university is operating according to its purposes as reflected in its con-
stituting legislation and governing documents as well as operating both legally and
ethically within the law and any other applicable internal and external rules
(Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, 2015). It is not a duty
of obedience of the board member to the board per se, nor is it a solidarity clause
with other board members, as potentially a board member may find themselves in
a situation where they must disobey the board if the university or board is breaking
the law or if the board is acting against the university’s best interest. Moreover, a di-
rector on a governing board is obliged to ensure their board colleagues are following
the law relevant to the corporation. However, loyalty has been interpreted to mean
that directors/boards of governors must comply with legislation as well as the cor-
poration’s governing documents (i.e., charter, constituting legislation, by-laws, etc.),
which may include following governing board policies around conduct (Carter &
Prendergast, 2011).
Taken together the duty of loyalty and obedience mean university governors must
carry out their duties according to the law, being loyal or true to the mission and pur-
poses of the university, independently and without self-interest, putting the interests
of member constituents as a whole above their own or the interests of the executives
of the corporation. The governing board members must execute their responsibilities
associated with the administration and management of the university property/assets
(pecuniary and non-pecuniary, such as reputational assets, goodwill, and also stand-
ing in the community) all the while protecting the interests of the principals.
Fiduciary duty of a trustee








of governors may be found to be acting as trustees; that is, in a guardianship role
over the assets of a charity. The trustee has the highest duty of care for a fiduciary
created by law. In these instances, acting as a trustee, director/board of a charitable
corporation have additional duties, including ensuring the charitable purposes of
the corporation are carried out and acting gratuitously for the charity. Furthermore,
they have duties to the beneficiary of the charity/trust that, in the Canadian university
setting may be considered to be the public and the constituent members of the uni-
versity that is the “community of scholars” (Harelkin v. University of Regina, 1979)
that makes up the university. This standard includes acting with the care and the
diligence of the prudent person protecting the charity’s property from risk or loss
and excessive administrative expense. The protection of charitable trusts is reflected
in the inherent equitable jurisdiction of the courts to intervene in the governance of
charities in order to monitor and regulate charities where funds or property have
been mismanaged (Carter & Prendergast, 2011; Ontario Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to animals v. Toronto Humane Society, 2010).
Fiduciary duties of a not-for-profit board 
Generally, the board of directors of a not-for-profit is accountable to the members
of the organization for managing and supervising the activities and affairs of the
corporation. Under federal not-for-profit legislation, not-for-profit directors are
not automatically considered trustees at law for any property of the corporation,
unless the not-for-profit is also a charity and a trust has been explicitly created, as
in the case of universities (Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act (NFP) Act, 2009,
s.32). University boards of governors are also captured by not-for-profit legal prin-
ciples, which are expanding in Canada. Boards of membership-based, not-for-profit
corporations, such as universities, have duties to constituent members, that, in
certain instances, may be defined as fiduciary duties, in addition to myriad duties
and obligations captured by contract and employment law (Burke-Robertson,
2002; Carter & Prendergast, 2011; Ontario Public Guardian and Trustees v. AIDS
Society for Children [Ontario], 2001; Pathak v. Hindu Sabha, 2004). In membership-
based non-profit corporations, such as universities, there are persons entitled to
elect or appoint the board of governors/directors. These elector members are typ-
ically those persons for whose benefit the corporation operates. In a university this
is the collegium (that is the staff, students, and faculty), which elects senate repre-
sentatives on the board of governors. It also includes the public who, through the
government, appoint members of the board from the larger community (Jones &
Skolnik, 1997).
Recent not-for-profit legislation in some provinces and at the federal level focuses
on enhancing not-for-profit member rights and remedies, making them akin to share-
holders rights in a for-profit corporation. The new not-for-profit legislation has clear
implications for the duties and decision-making of university boards. This suggests
that, going forward in Canada, not-for-profit boards may need to consider in their
decision-making stakeholder member interests to a greater degree than before.
Moreover, external members of Canadian university boards are volunteers, who carry








and by-laws. This feature shapes the dynamics of governing a university as a not-
for-profit corporation, making it different from governing boards of a for-profit entity
(Amundson, 2002).
The fiduciary standard of care
Identifying the appropriate standard of care for university governors (that is, the
level at which they must execute their fiduciary duties) is challenging because the
law governing them is a mix of the law on charities, law on trusts, the law of not-for-
profits organizations, and the law of corporations (Bourgeois, 2004; Carter &
Prendergast, 2011; Cullity, 2002). In addition, in a university landscape, these areas
of law can be layered with contract and labour law, as well as principles of natural
justice. Moreover, the university as an organization is judicially recognized as a col-
legium/community of scholars and a public service type of organization akin to a
foundation. Each of these areas has different legislation and case law governing it,
with different standards of care.
The typical standard of care for directors of not-for-profit corporation under fed-
eral not-for-profit legislation is the objective standard of the “reasonably prudent
person” (Canada Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, SC 2009, c 23, s.148). That is to say
that directors and officers are required to exercise at least the level of care, diligence,
and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in their decision-making
in similar circumstances. In Canada some constituting university statutes set out the
specific duties of the board and the standard of these duties. University governing
boards may also rely on the standards of conduct spelled out in ancillary regulations,
by-laws, or policies created by the university officers or the governing board itself.
If the university statute is silent on the standard of care or the university is exempt
from the provincial not-for-profit legislation, then the common law standard applies.
The common law standard for boards is a higher, more subjective standard than the
statutory standard, and it requires that a director’s actions be at the standard of the
reasonable prudent person with the same expertise, skill, and knowledge. This
means if a board member is a financial executive with extensive board experience,
the board member will be held to that standard in decision-making, not to the stan-
dard of the ordinary person.
The 1928 American case of Meinhard and Salmon (164 N.E. 545 [N.Y.1928])
sets out in absolute language and high moral tone the uncompromising fiduciary
standard of care, defined by Judge Cardozo as “the duty of finest loyalty” and “stricter
than the morals of the marketplace”:
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,
is then the standard of behavior. As to this, there has developed a
tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity
has been the attitude of the courts of equity when petitioned to un-
dermine the rule of individual loyalty by the “disintegrating erosion”
of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fi-
duciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.
… A loyalty that is undivided and unselfish. The rule of undivided








Scholarship suggests that, in theory, the fiduciary duty attempts to offer clarity to
the problem of complexity and multiple, conflicting interests in relationships.
However, it is less clear what this standard actually means, or looks like, in terms of
real-life practice (Anderson, 1978; Minow, 2016; Thompson, 2008). One legal
scholar suggests “The punctilio phrasing provides a standard rather than a rule, a
clear statement as to tone and direction, but little in the way of specific guidance for
resolving hard questions” (Thompson, 2008, p. 21).
Finally, the lofty ideals of Cardoza’s statement of the fiduciary standard are prac-
tically limited and watered down by the “business judgement rule,” which makes it
very difficult to find directors liable for a breach of fiduciary duty if they have fol-
lowed the usual procedures in their business in making a decision. Courts are less
likely to second guess, even if their decisions and judgement are wrong and cause
injury (Minow, 2016). In effect the business judgement rule lowers liability and the
standard of care in that directors/boards of governors will not be held liable for mis-
takes made after an honest and good faith evaluation of a decision if adequate
scrutiny of issues is done before making decisions. While the business judgement
rule may or may not be available to boards of governors of Canadian universities as
charities, given the higher fiduciary duty required of trustees of charities, it does pro-
vide the principle of diligent scrutiny of decisions as a standard for directors and
boards of governors (Carter & Prendergast, 2011).
Analysis: Key issues in governance
To whom is the fiduciary duty of care owed in the university context
It is well established that governing board members of universities in Canada are
considered fiduciaries at law. However, it is less clear to whom the duty is owed in
a university context. Generally, in not-for-profits and charitable corporations, such
as universities, the boards of governors owe fiduciary duties to the “corporation”;
trustee fiduciary duties to the named beneficiary of the trust (the public and any
donors) when dealing with charitable property; and trustee duties to the
members/constituents of the charitable not-for-profit organization. Contemporary
legal commentary and case law on private business corporations suggests that the fi-
duciary duty of a governing board is owed holistically to “the corporation,” not the
shareholders and not separately to each individual members or stakeholder groups
(Carter & Prendergast, 2011; London Humane Society (Re), 2010 ONSC 5775, [2010]
OJ No 4827 (Ont Sup Ct J ) at para. 19). However, it is not clear if and how this line
of scholarship and case precedents applies to a university context given its hybrid
features as a charitable, not-for-profit, corporate collegium.
What is the corporation? Who is the corporation? 
At law the corporation is a legal construct. It is considered a person—an independent
legal entity that can hold property, be sued, and holds the same rights and obligations
of a person in law. The corporation is separate and distinct from shareholders and
other constituents within the corporate organization (including the board). This legal
fiction allows the activities of a corporation to be captured by regulation in the same








two people to exist between the board and the corporation. In a corporate context,
directors of governing boards are the “fiduciary” and the corporation (as a legal “per-
son”) is the “principal” to whom the duty is owed (Welling, 1991). As a legal person
the corporation is a separate and distinct entity, the interests of which may, or may
not, align with the membership of the organization.
This legal understanding complicates the relationship between the corporation
as an organization and the shareholder/constituents of the corporation, especially in
the university context. The view of the university as a singular corporate “person”
runs counter to the historical structure and nature of the university as a collegial,
self-governing community of scholars—two core ideals of the Western university.
Furthermore, the legal construct of the corporation as a singular homogeneous legal
person presents particular difficulties in understanding the fiduciary duties of gov-
erning boards within the contemporary context of the university as a “multiversity,”
with a complex, diverse environment where there are, by the very nature of the uni-
versity, many competing interests (Fallis, 2007; Kerr, 2001). Owing a fiduciary duty
to all of the constituents at once presents problems in defining the duty of loyalty.
Minow tells us “Accountability to everyone is accountability to no one, and it is im-
possible to apply the fiduciary standard without a clear understanding of who the
beneficiary is” (2016, p. 245). And this may be part of the challenge in applying the
law in this area to universities—a legal construct has been grafted onto the structures
of the university and it does not quite fit.
Who is the corporation? Who is the university? While commentary is clear that
the governing board owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation, is less clear from
statute and case law if the university and the corporation are one and the same thing.
The constituting statutes of the universities in Canada are inconsistent and offer var-
ious answers to these questions. For example, under the statute constituting Western
University (An Act respecting The University of Western Ontario, Bill Pr14, 1982, as re-
vised by Bill Pr37, chapter Pr26, S.O., 1988 at section 1 and 8.), the “university” is
defined vaguely and the corporate body is, perplexingly, defined as the governing
board and not the university. 
s.1 (m) “University” means The University of Western Ontario, but
does not include any college affiliated with the University.
s.8. The Board of Governors of the University is hereby continued
as a body corporate by the name “The Board of Governors, The
University of Western Ontario.” 
If, indeed, the board of governors at Western University is the corporate body, under
corporate law principles board members would owe a fiduciary duty to themselves,
and they would be both fiduciary and beneficiary/principal at one and the same
time. This conception defies the principles of trust and fiduciary law and, frankly,
makes no sense legally.8 By contrast in Alberta, the Post Secondary Learning Act (Post-
Secondary Learning Act, SA 2003, c P-19.5 s 11(2) and s 16(2)) tells us that both the
governing board and the senate of universities are each individual corporate bodies.
This means there are two corporate entities within Alberta’s universities, and neither








Act R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 468 (Consolidation 2017) s.3(4) clearly states that each uni-
versity is a distinct corporation.
University statutes and case law complicate and confuse the discussion of who
owes whom a fiduciary duty within the university setting. It is clear that the legal
principles of corporate law, charitable trusts, and fiduciary duties do not map onto
the governance of the university very well. This raises the question of whether it is
possible to apply the fiduciary standard without a clear understanding of who is the
beneficiary and who is the corporation, who is the university and who is the charity.
What does the “best interests” of the organization mean? 
And who gets to decide? 
It is difficult to determine what are “the best interests” of the university. Some define
“best interests” in terms of financial sustainability, for others it is about academic
quality and rigour, for others it is about productivity, efficiency, accountability, and
transparency, and others again it is about upholding democratic principles. All of
these ideas emerge in the university landscape and are consistent with the various
missions and objectives of the university embedded in constituting statutes, yet each
of them may be defined differently depending on the location within the university.
This case law suggests that in determining “best interests,” one group’s interests
cannot supersede another group’s interests, and that the governing board must make
balanced decisions protecting the interest of the whole entity itself. However, the insti-
tution’s interests in the university setting are by its very nature heterogeneous. The uni-
versity in form and structure is fragmented into faculties and departments; it has flat
collegial self-governance structures and hierarchical, managerial, bureaucratic, and ad-
ministrative structures. Academic work is both horizontally and vertically fragmented,
which challenges governance and leadership (Jones, 2013). Clark Kerr (2001) in his
book The Uses of the University describes the modern university as a “multiversity”
(p. 1–7). George Fallis (2007) takes this metaphor and describes contemporary uni-
versities as sprawling conglomerates providing liberal undergraduate, graduate, and
professional education that is responsible for society’s research enterprise. Fallis (2007)
argues that contemporary Canadian universities have multiple missions, including
teaching and research, but also that contemporary universities are fundamentally insti-
tutions of democracy and part of their mission and role in society is their contribution
to democratic life.9 The fiduciary obligation expressed in corporate case law requires
that the board of governors protects the best interests of the university as a holistic or-
ganization. This notion negates everything we know about the modern university, its
evolution over the last century and the nature of academic life, scholarship, and activ-
ities. Just as the notion of the corporation as a person is a legal fiction, the notion of the
university as a homogenous entity is an analytic fantasy. In such a diverse environment
there is no singular interest and it is difficult to determine who speaks for whom, which
challenges the application of the fiduciary standard to governing board decisions. 
The role of university governing boards: Guardianship or
representative constituency?








and is accountable for the financial aspects of the university.10 It is made up of ex-
officio members (the chancellor and the president and vice chancellor of the univer-
sity), internal members, external members, and honourary members. Typically
governing board membership includes students elected from the student body; rep-
resentatives of the senate elected by the university senate; members of the non-aca-
demic university staff; representatives appointed or elected by alumnae; and
members broadly reflective of the community at large appointed by the government
or the governing board itself, as set out in board by-laws or regulations (Jones &
Skolnik, 1997). Whereas the largest group on the governing board is the external
public constituents appointed by the board or government, by contrast the academic
governing body (senate) is made up of a majority of internal faculty members.
Nevertheless, the governing boards of publicly funded Canadian universities do con-
tain representatives from a large number of internal constituents, including faculty
and student constituencies.11 Glen Jones and Michael Skolnik noted in their 1997
study that it “is clear that Canadian universities have placed a high value on attempt-
ing to ensure that both internal and external interests are taken into consideration”
(p. 293) in their decision-making. They also note that this high representation of in-
ternal members on university governing boards is “the factor that most differenti-
ates Canadian boards from their American counterparts” (p. 293). Recent scholarship
suggests that, historically, American universities followed the Scottish model, where
a lay board is responsible for college governance, whereas Canadian universities fol-
lowed the English model and gave faculty the majority of the governance responsi-
bility in the form of a strong senate and faculty representation on boards
(Galick-Moazen, 2012).
The constituting statutes of Canadian universities explicitly design the gover-
nance of the university boards for representation of the university’s members.
Therefore, some of the internal members sitting on the governing board come to the
position with an automatic dual loyalty, as they are elected to the governing board
precisely to represent the interests of their constituent group within the university.
In this respect it has been argued that the university governance and decision-making
functions in the manner of a parliament, a representative democracy, and follows
the parliamentary rules of order (CAUTb, 2018). This democratic structure is con-
sistent with the core role and mission of the publicly funded university in Canadian
society as a democratizing institution (Fallis, 2007).
The membership of governing boards is significant to the discussion of fiduciary
duties as there is a potential for conflicts of interest when members are from multiple
constituencies—and this potential for conflicts may be greater in a Canadian uni-
versity context than in an American university context given the larger proportion
of internal board members. It is also significant because American legal commentary
on the fiduciary duties of university governing boards should perhaps be referred to
with caution in the Canadian university context because the actual composition of
Canadian university boards and American university boards are different.
At the same time Canadian universities place a high value on collegial, democratic
decision-making, and this principle of governance is recognized by the case law. It is








from private sector corporate boards and from many America university boards. From
this perspective, constituency representation is crucial and most desirable. Herein
lays the source of considerable tension in Canadian university governance: What is
the role of the board of governors in a Canadian university? Is it the role of a guardian
of a trust or is it the role of constituency representation? Or is it, can it be, both?
The guardianship view of the board of governors emphasizes the university as a
public trust and draws on charity law. This view is closer to the American view of a
university board of governors as trustees, and indeed the American scholarship refers
to university board members explicitly as trustees (Engel & Achola, 1983; Floyd,
1995; Kaplin & Lee, 1995; Kerr & Gade, 1989). While this view emphasizes the high-
est fiduciary duty of the governors toward the university, it is less collegial and may
occur at the expense of institutional autonomy and self-governance. It emphasizes
the university’s charitable nature, which allows for greater intervention by the courts
into university governance in cases of mismanagement and allows for greater remedies
for aggrieved constituent members. Courts will exercise their prerogative jurisdiction
over a charity if the board of governors is acting in a way that may jeopardize the
charity’s assets (whether they are property, resources, or reputational assets). The
trustee view also places high demands on board reporting and accountability for pub-
lic funds. This governance arrangement usually has external, lay, public constituents
as the dominant and majority group on the board of governors, as evident in America.
By contrast the constituency representation view places a high value on balance
between internal and external representation and interests. This perspective is closer
to the Canadian governance arrangements, which have high numbers of internal
members elected to their boards (Jones & Skolnik, 1997). This approach emphasizes
collegial decision-making and faculty input into governance. It values and defends
the autonomy of the university, eschewing external interference from the government
or courts as a self-governing professional body. This view is also reflected in the
Canadian Supreme Court case law on the nature of the university (see Harelkin v.
University of Regina, 1979) and is also evident in the university constituting statutes
themselves, which require that governing board membership include elected repre-
sentation internal to the university.12 This principle of organizational democracy is
also consistent with the Canadian trend on the laws of not-for profits, as seen in the
changes to the federal NFP Act, 2009, which increases not-for-profit members’ access
to information and enhances their rights, their legal remedies against errant boards,
and provides for a greater role for members in the governance of their corporation.
However, representative boards have the potential for more conflicts. Members of
Canadian university boards come to the board with divided loyalties: to constituents
that elected them, as well as to the corporate person of the university.
Tension between the guardianship view and the constituency representation
view of university governance has existed for decades in Canada. Both views are re-
flected in the case law, statutes, and commentary on university governance.
Regardless, the question of whether the board should function representatively and
responsively to university constituencies impacts on the shape of governing board
fiduciary duties. The contradictions between these competing views are reflected in








duty of loyalty. For example, a recent governance review at Western University seems
to advocate both a guardianship and representative view of governance, going so far
as to suggest that board members must check their identity at the door once they
become members of the board:
It would be contrary to this fiduciary responsibility to have “repre-
sentatives” of particular constituencies voting at the direction of
their organizations. Regardless of how someone gets to the Board
table, or who put them there, once a person becomes a Board mem-
ber, his or her loyalty must lie with the best, long term interests of
the university… (Report of the Governance Review Task Force
UWO, 2015, p. 4)
This same report goes on to contradict itself:
The Act determines the membership of the Board and provides for
members to be elected from faculty, staff and student constituencies
and those internal members of the board bring the views and con-
cerns of their constituents to the table. (Report of the Governance
Review Task Force UWO, 2015, p. 4)
A recent report from the Canadian Association of University Teachers (2018b)
captures the essence of the contradiction in a university setting:
In the case of the academy, such appointments are not made to per-
sons who happen to be academic staff, but made because they are
academic staff. To subsequently obstruct or interfere with a repre-
sentational member consulting or canvassing the academic staff
community they are to represent cannot be acting in the best inter-
ests of an institution as it is contrary to the university governance
model itself. Recognizing representation, but denying representa-
tional rights, undercuts collegial governance and the representa-
tional framework on which it is based. (p. 5)
Conclusions: Implications for shared governance—“Fraught 
with history and traditions” 13 
Mapping the corporate legal framework onto the university is fraught with tensions,
difficulties, and disconnects. Although the nomenclature may be the same, the uni-
versity in form or function is not a typical corporation. It is, legally, a unique, hybrid
organizational type. This may explain the confusion and contradictions evident in
the field of higher education around the fiduciary duties of governing boards. Indeed
legal scholars have observed that, 
The reasons that the letter of the law is not necessarily followed in
the academy can be attributed to the unique historical rights and tra-
ditions inherent to a community of scholars. (Davis, 2015b, p. 200)
For various reasons entrenched in the history of academia, the ex-
pectations of faculty and the practice of universities do not follow








Moreover, philosophically there are at least two different views that are active in
Canadian board governance. From a charitable corporation perspective, conflicts of
interests are undesirable and must be avoided. Whereas from a “community of schol-
ars” collegial perspective, conflicts of interest are inevitable and a desirable part of
the culture, history, and tradition of academic life, essential in the creation and testing
of knowledge, protected by the principles of academic freedom, and a fundamental
feature of the university. Legal commentators have also observed that in addition to
the general conflict of values and priorities between universities and corporations,
there is a difference in the way universities operate in policies, procedures, and prac-
tices that are incongruent to business practices with the for-profit sector. Conduct
and obligations that are common in, and reasonable for, an industry setting would
be untenable in an academic setting. For example, practices around confidentiality
and non-disclosure play out very differently in the two settings and this can influence
what governing boards believe is appropriate for decision-making (Lowe & Lennon,
2015). The area of confidentiality and non-disclosure is particularly relevant here,
as the trend in Canada among governing boards is to include such obligations in
their codes of conduct. Jeffrey Lowe and Christopher Lennon (2015) highlight the
different cultural environments:
Unlike a business corporation, which often has obligations of con-
fidentiality built directly into the employment agreements of its per-
sonnel, postsecondary institutions typically encourage at least a
subset of their personnel-namely faculty, graduate students and
other researchers … to share ideas and publish findings. Moreover
the category of personnel likely to come into access confidential in-
formation in an academic community are much more diverse than
in a commercial operation … The culture and practice of postsec-
ondary institutions is simply not one where commitments of confi-
dentiality are easily implemented. (p. 216)
In summary, the legal framework for university governance in Canada is ex-
tremely complex and layered. The nature of the university as an organization and
its legal status are determined by myriad old and new statutes and case law, as well
as medieval and modern forms and protocols mixed together. Its governance and
legal status encompasses the law of corporations and the law of charities and trusts.
To this must be added historical academic customs and the institutional practices
of the collegium (whether or not enshrined in statute, but recognized in case law),
together with current policies and by-laws within individual universities as well as
across the higher education community, which have become the established con-
duct (usages) of the university. This can result in “paradoxes [that] can make uni-
versity governance a difficult proposition” (Davis, 2015b, pp. 57–58) and
inconsistencies in the application of the law. In fact, a number of legal scholars have
commented on the unique nature of the university as a legal organization making
the application of the black letter law in several legal areas (governance, intellectual
property, spin-off companies, and confidentiality agreements, to name a few) un-









The law on fiduciary duties has implications for shared collegial governance and
decision-making in universities. The law on fiduciary duties provides a legal standard,
but not a clear statement or rule that can be easily applied in all decisions. It offers
little guidance for resolving hard questions. Moreover, the publicly funded, charita-
ble, collegial multiversity in Canada is a unique entity and context with a public mis-
sion, purpose, and stakeholders. This influences the nature of the fiduciary duties
of governing boards and to whom they are owed. This is by no means a dilution of
the standard but a more complicated standard. Furthermore, the autonomy of uni-
versity governance and decision-making is exercised within a larger political context
and within broader societal structures and values. In Canada, the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms has changed the legal landscape of the university and impacted uni-
versity decision-making and board governance. The Charter has increased our aware-
ness of individual rights and freedoms. There is an increased expectation for the
protection of these rights within society, including within the university (Dickinson,
1988; Hannah & Stack, 2015). The case law on the applicability of the Charter to
universities has altered our understanding of the nature of university autonomy. It
layers our understanding of the relationship between universities, governing boards,
and their constituents. Inevitably, this influences the shape of governing board fidu-
ciary duties.
Board members need to be aware of and appreciate the complexity of this work-
ing environment. In their decision-making they would do well to consult broadly
and diligently scrutinize all issues and concerns brought forth from the various con-
stituents making up the university. Transparency in board decision-making is also
crucial. Internal and external accountability structures and mechanisms must be put
in place and followed. Assiduous attention to due process and fairness goes a long
way to establishing good faith in decision-making. In this context, the roles of faculty
in Canadian universities, in faculty associations, and on senate within the dual gov-
ernance structure of the university, are critical to the proper functioning of the uni-
versity governance model in ensuring that board fiduciary duties are met. Both
avenues into governance provide a check and balance on the board of governors
within a particularly insulated decision-making environment, where the courts and
government have allowed Canadian universities high institutional autonomy, shield-
ing boards’ decisions and conduct from review and oversight. Ultimately engaging
the shared collegial governance structure of the university will enable boards to better
navigate the complicated leadership space and will strengthen decision-making.
Notes
In fact the new federal Not-for-profit Act (2009) provides for incorporation as of right,1.
whereby the approval of the minister is not required, and allows for electronic filing.
Approval of the incorporation is automatic if the statutory requirements are met.
Corporate by-laws are not included in incorporation package and are not reviewed by
Corporations Canada staff.
The nomenclature varies across Canadian universities as to the name of the senior aca-2.
demic decision-making body and the senior financial/administrative body. Typically,
they are called the senate and the governing board, respectively, but not exclusively.
This can cause confusion in the literature and in the field. Also, some universities are or-
ganized in a unicameral structure (e.g., University of Toronto) while others have opted








the unicameral, bi-cameral, or tri-cameral structures in Canadian universities the pres-
ence of a senior academic and a senior financial and/or administrative decision-making
body. For the purpose of clarity within this article, these bodies are referred to as the
“senate” and the “governing board.”
The case law varies based on the facts in each case. For example, booking space for3.
non-academic extracurricular activities at the university has been found to be non-gov-
ernmental activity (Lobo v. Carlton University, 2012). Likewise, standards and grading
are within university discretion and are non-governmental (Jaffer v. York University,
2010; King v. Ryerson University, 2015; Lam v. University of Western Ontario, 2015). There
is extensive case law that sets out the educational relationship between universities and
students as governed by an implied private contract to educate, provide appropriate in-
struction, and offer the educational services needed to obtain the credential that may in-
clude providing housing, co-op placements, parking, library services, and computer
facilities in exchange for student fees. (See Hannah & Stack, 2015, for an extensive re-
view). Patrick Gilligan-Hackett and Pamela Murray (2015) review the case law govern-
ing university-faculty relationships, observing that the law of contract provides the
primary foundation for the employment relationship between faculty and the university.
Nevertheless all of this is qualified by Charter case law and the determinations of
whether, and when, a university is acting as a governmental actor.
In the province of British Columbia, for example, the provincial government has intro-4.
duced mandate letters for universities that match the university’s planned targeted pro-
grams and priorities with budget allocations for the coming fiscal year. Similarly, in
Ontario, the provincial government has Strategic Mandate Agreements with each uni-
versity that requires it to provide the government with strategic planning information
on priorities and targets with funding attached. See Shanahan (2015b) for a discussion
of strategic federal funding programs and Shanahan (2015c) and Shanahan (2015d) for
a discussion of the range of provincial regulatory mechanisms around funding, quality,
and accountability employing strategic planning requirements.
Note that this is an American association. Nevertheless the Canadian equivalent,5.
Canadian University Boards Association (CUBA), directs it member universities to the
American website for this information, and many Canadian university governing
boards are members of this American organization and so are perhaps guided by this
statement and other comments on the site. While this statement about fiduciary duties
is consistent with the Canadian case law on fiduciary duties generally, the organization’s
additional commentary on what this statement means in practice for governing boards’
conduct is not consistent with Canadian case law on the collegium and representative-
ness of governance arrangements in Canadian universities. That is to say, their explica-
tion of duties reflects the American landscape, which has a different mix of private and
public universities. This is one of the limitations of policy borrowing from other juris-
dictions, especially around law and governance.
One important theme that does come up in the case law and in contemporary business6.
law commentary and practice is that disclosure to shareholders, beneficiaries, and mem-
bership is part of one’s fiduciary duty. “Disclosure and the substance of fiduciary duty
have long been intertwined in American corporate and securities law” (Thompson,
2008, p. 23). That is to say that a fiduciary must disclose risks, opportunities, and con-
flicts to the beneficiary’s interests. In other words, disclosure can be part of the duty of
loyalty. This is relevant to the university context.
For example see University of Toronto’s Act (1971), which sets out openness of gover-7.
nance meetings: 
Section 2(18) The meetings, except meetings of committee of the whole, of the
Governing Council shall be open to the public, prior notice of the meetings shall
be given to the members and to the public in such a manner as the Governing
Council by by-law shall determine, and no person shall be excluded therefrom ex-
cept for improper conduct, but where intimate financial or personal matters of any








son shall be held in camera unless such person requests that such part of the meet-
ing be open to the public. 1971, c. 56, s. 2(16–218).
Western University’s Act is not the only university statute that conflates the board with8.
the corporation. See also University of Toronto Act s. 2(1), which calls the University of
Toronto’s governing council a “corporation.” And also under the University of Ottawa
Act (The University of Ottawa Act, S.O. 1965, C.137), the board of governors are named
as the body corporate.
For an exhaustive review of models of universities in scholarship that have emerged9.
over Western-European history see Raymond P. Kybartas’ (1996) Ideas of the University:
Towards a Classification System Based on Ideal Types. Using a historical-philosophical
lens and a Weberian “ideal type” method, Kybartas classifies six university models that
he argues represents the range of potential university types including: the liberal univer-
sity; the research university; the economic university; the social university; the transfor-
mational university; and the radical university. These are not mutually exclusive types
and can be combined in various models. Clark Kerr (2001) and George Fallis (2007),
both economists, academics, and former university administrators, present a new con-
ceptualization of the contemporary Anglo-American multiversity that emerged in the
second half of the twentieth century, as sprawling, diverse, complex conglomerates that
incorporate elements of these ideal types. Although they concede that the central task of
the contemporary Anglo-American university continues to be undergraduate education,
they argue the contemporary university has many tasks and roles in a post-industrial so-
ciety, which this article argues complicates the responsibilities of leadership. 
This typically reads in statutes as “management and control of the University and of its10.
property, revenues, expenditures, business and affairs are vested in the Board, and the
Board has all powers necessary or convenient to perform its duties and achieve the ob-
jects and purposes of the University” (York University Act, 1965, s.10).
Jones and Skolnik’s 1997 study on Canadian governing boards reported a third of the11.
members of governing boards who participated in their study were from internal con-
stituencies. Faculty and students made up than a quarter of members on average. Fewer
than a quarter are appointed by government.
For one example see s.19 of British Columbia’s University Act R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 46812.
(Consolidation last updated by the Office of the University Counsel on 28 June 2017).
See Davis, 2015a, p. 66.13.
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